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I. INTRODUCTION
Worldwide business thrived in the late 1990s. Stock markets were
exuberant,1 multinationals were selling to the far corners of the planet,
and the world was more or less at peace. But like a reverse month of
March, the twentieth century ended like a lamb and the twenty-first
started like a lion. The 2000 American presidential election proved to
be an affair more complex than simply counting votes; September 11,
2001, became a date forever etched in the collective mind; and in
* ©2006 Manish Gupta. B.A., 2000, The George Washington University; J.D.,
2006, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I thank Professors Finbarr
McCarthy, Ursula Kilkelly, and Irene Lynch Fannon for inciting my passion for
corporate and tax law, and Jill Sears for making research in Ireland possible.
1. The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, set off a
firestorm of debate when in a 1996 speech he noted "irrational exuberance" in the
financial markets. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the
Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research: The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society
(Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
1996/19961205.htm.
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November of 2001 the fifth-largest American company, 2 Enron
Corporation, went bankrupt. In lemming-like fashion, companies
around the world followed Enron in disclosing scandalous corporate
and accounting practices.
Responses were swift, especially in the corporate governance
arena. In the United States, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX), a bill that would set the example for how governments
worldwide, including in Ireland, would regulate corporations. For its
part, the Celtic Tiger-named for the exceptional economic growth
that Ireland experienced in the 1990s,4-had what might be called
economic growing pains. From 1996 through 2005, Ireland saw its
real Gross Domestic Product grow an average of 7.2% per year,
compared to 2.8% in the European Union and 3.0% in the United
States.5 With a low 12.5% corporate tax rate established in 1997,6
Ireland has experienced a "Delaware effect" in becoming a favored
site for incorporation in the European Union.7 This growth came
quickly, outpacing the development of a suitable regulatory scheme.
The inevitable incongruence in the market-in particular scandals at
Elan Corporation and Allied Irish Banks-fomented new legislation
that mirrored the regulatory scheme of the United States.
This article reviews and compares how the United States and
Ireland responded to corporate scandals. Part II introduces the basics
of Irish corporate law to facilitate an understanding of the context in
which various scandals and legislation occurred. Because Ireland
2. Enron ranked number five on the 2002 Fortune 500 list. See
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2002/ (last visited
July 6, 2008).
3. See infra Part 111.
4. Irene Lynch Fannon, The Luck of the Irish or Just Plain Old Tax and
Regulatory Planning? The Success of Venture Capitalism in Ireland, 1 ENTREPREN.
Bus. L.J. 231, 231-32 (2006). Ireland's economic growth is often compared to the
growth of the "Asian Tigers" in the 1980s. Id.
5. Id. at 236.
6. Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 (Act No. 39/1997) (Ir.). The rate was
originally 10%, but it was raised to 12.5% because of pressure from the rest of
Europe. Fannon, supra note 4, at 242 n.35.
7. Fannon, supra note 4, at 244. Other factors that make Ireland a favorable
location for incorporation include: favorable individual and capital gains tax rates
compared to the rest of Europe, tax incentives for property development, and short
setup times and small capital requirements for new firms. Id. at 243-44.
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belongs to the European Union, this section also contains a description
of basic EU corporate law. Part III discusses the corporate scandals
that took place in Ireland and Europe, and Part IV describes the Irish
corporate governance legislation brought about by the various
scandals. Once again, this section also reviews those EU regulations,
directives, and proposals that are germane to corporate law in Ireland.
A brief review of SOX is included for reference and comparison with
the new Irish Legislation. Finally, Part V analyzes the Irish legislation
to conclude that it is out of proportion to Irish problems, but that the
legal changes fit into a trend of convergence in which the United
States provides the model for corporate governance and the European
Union acts merely as a competent, almost academic body to facilitate
the unification of diverse corporate practices. Ireland, for its part, is a
prime example of such convergence.
II. INTRODUCTION TO IRISH AND EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW
To better understand the recent changes in Irish corporate law and
to provide a backdrop of the legal context in which the various old
world scandals occurred, this Part provides a brief introduction into
Irish and European corporate law. Part II.A gives a description of the
structure and history of basic Irish corporate law. Part II.B outlines the
EU regulations and directives that impact Member States, including
Ireland.8
A. Irish Company Law
Ireland uses the term "company law" to refer to the body of law
that governs corporations. 9 The general structure of Irish company law
is closely modeled on England's laws.10 Since declaring its
independence in 1916, Ireland has continued to use English statutes as
models and since acceding to the European Union in 1973, it has
drafted many statutes to comply with various EU directives.1 More
8. EU law has "primacy" over Irish law. NIGEL FOSTER, FOSTER ON EU LAW
166(2006).
9. Tomran, Inc. v. Passano (Tomran I), 891 A.2d 336, 346 n.9 (Md. 2006).
10. Tomran, Inc. v. Passano (Tomran 1), 862 A.2d 453, 463 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004), afffd, 891 A.2d 336.
11. Tomran II, 891 A.2d at 347.
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recently, Ireland has been using examples from the United States.' 2
Irish company law is contained in eleven statutes starting with the first
Companies Act in 1963. However, much of the current Irish
regulatory scheme is relatively new, having its foundations in the
Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001 (CLEA) and the Companies
(Auditing and Accounting) Act, 2003 (CAAA). The CLEA and the
CAAA are described in detail in Part IV.
Irish corporations come in two basic forms: private companies
(denoted by "Ltd." following the name) and public limited companies
(with "plc" indicating the corporation's public status). 13 Forming a
company requires payment of a registration fee to the Companies
Registration Office (CRO), 14 as well as submitting and filing Form Al
and two constitutional documents: a Memorandum of Association and
Articles of Association. 15 The Memorandum must contain the
company name, an objects clause describing what the company has
the capacity to do, a statement of limited liability, and the initial
number of shares and share capital. 16 The Articles act as bylaws for
the company. If a newly-formed company does not register Articles
with the CRO, the Companies Act, 1963, supplies model articles
which will govern the internal rules of the company. 17
Once a company is formed it has perpetual existence. The
company ceases to exist when it is "wound up" by its members
(voluntary liquidation) or when a court orders a bankrupt company to
fold (compulsory liquidation).' 8 Creditors often seek voluntary
liquidation, a sort of private bankruptcy where the company
deliberately agrees to fold and pay off debts.' 9
12. See infra Part IV for a comparison of the various legislative responses to
corporate scandals.
13. Companies (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 13/1983) (Ir.) § 4.
14. The CRO maintains a website with information relating to forming
companies in Ireland. See Companies Registration Office,
http://www.cro.ie/enh/homepage.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). The CRO issues
certificates of incorporation.
15. PAUL EGAN, IRISH CORPORATE PROCEDURES 19-20 (2d ed. 1996).
16. CHRISTOPHER DOYLE, THE COMPANY SECRETARY 4-6 (2d ed. 2002).
17. EGAN, supra note 15, at 19-20.
18. Id. at 6; see also Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Jr.) § 213
(describing procedures for court-ordered wind-ups).
19. SINEAD MCGRATH, COMPANY LAW 358-59 (2003).
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Irish corporations have a separate legal personality and
shareholder liability is limited to the amount of subscribed share
capital.2 ° Though shares must have a par value,21 shareholders in a
public company need only pay twenty-five percent of their share's
nominal value and shares in private companies need not be paid up at
all.22 Public companies must issue a minimum of C38,09223 in share
capital.24 Upon winding up, the liability of shareholders for company
debts is limited to any amount unpaid on their shares.25
Pre-incorporation contracts are binding on the company; 26
however, companies may only contract to do those acts listed in the
objects clause of their Memorandum. Consequently, objects clauses
often run many pages. Under the doctrine of ultra vires, a corporation
can avoid a contract on the ground that one of the contracting parties
is attempting to do some activity not authorized by its incorporating
documents. 27 This doctrine is still alive in Ireland, and courts may
refuse to enforce contracts if a company tries to do an act not listed in
its objects clause.28 However, the doctrine of ultra vires has been
modified by statute to protect third parties who were reasonably
unaware of the company's violation of its own objects clause. 29 Courts
have discretion to pierce the corporate veil if justice so requires. 30
20. See Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd, [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.); PRICE
WATERHOUSE COOPERS, DOING BUSINESS AND INVESTING IN IRELAND 13 (2005),
available at http://www.pwc.com/ie/eng/ins-sol/publpwc-dobiz05_full.pdf
[hereinafter PWC].
21. EGAN, supra note 15, at 21.
22. Id. at 22.
23. The E38,092 figure had previously been set at IR£30,000, but with the
1999 change to the Euro it became the oddity that it is today.
24. PWC, supra note 20, at 15.
25. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 1.
26. EGAN, supra note 15, at 21.
27. Small Bus. Admin. v. Echevarria, 864 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (S.D. Fla.
1994); In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d 838, 844 n.7 (3d Cir. 1964).
28. See Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (It.) § 8(2).
29. Id. § 8(1).
30. Power Supermarket v. Crumlin Invs. and Dunnes Stores (Crumlin) Ltd.,
[1981] Unreported (H. Ct.) (t.) (lifting the corporate veil on a group structure
because "the justice of the case so requires"); see also State (Mclnerney & Co., Ltd.)
v. Dublin County Council, [1985] I.R. 1 (Ir.) ("The arm which lifts the corporate
veil must be that of justice.").
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Whether to issue dividends is a board decision 3 1 and dividends
may only be paid out of the profits of a solvent company.
32
Companies may issue common, preferred, and redeemable shares.
33
Public companies can issue shares by offering them to the public
(usually with the underwriting of an Irish merchant bank, called an
"issuing house" 34), or by offering them to preexisting shareholders
either as a stock dividend or under right-of-first-refusal
circumstances. 35 Public companies may list with and trade securities
on the Irish Stock Exchange 36 under regulations known as the "Yellow
Book. '37 Among the more important rules found in the Yellow Book
are: at least one quarter of a company's shares must be held by the
public, a company must have been a going and solvent concern for at
least three years prior to listing, and a company must have a market
capitalization of at least C1. 14 million.3
8
Irish companies with un-issued capital commonly issue bonus
shares that are a dividend to existing shareholders. These dividends
are not simple share dividends (i.e., a three for one split where the
holder of a share worth $100 receives three shares each worth $33.33).
They are a distribution of rights to existing capital (i.e., a one for three
bonus will give a shareholder owning three shares worth $100 per
share one additional share that is also worth $100. His shareholdings
increase from three to four and the value of his shares increases from
$300 to $400). The company's capital is not diminished; rather, the
rights to that capital are divided among current shareholders.
39
Irish bonds, commonly called debentures, are usually secured with
company assets; thus they are closer to mortgages than American-
style corporate debt.40 A debenture-holder can secure his debt via
31. See Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Co., [1902] 1 I.L.R. 353 (Ir.).
32. MCGRATH, supra note 19, at 191; see also Companies (Amendment) Act,
1983 (Act No. 13/1983) (Ir.) §§ 45-51.
33. EGAN, supra note 15, at 32.
34. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 26.
35. McGRATH, supra note 19, at 204-05.
36. EGAN, supra note 15, at 34.
37. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 27.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 244.
40. Id. at 193.
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either a fixed charge or a floating charge. A fixed charge is secured by
a specific asset, whereas a floating charge becomes fixed (crystallizes)
only if the company goes bankrupt or the parties agree that a specific
event will fix the charge.41 In the event of bankruptcy, fixed charges
have priority over floating charges and both have priority over
shares.42
Irish companies have the same basic stakeholders as the Anglo-
American system, though their nomenclature and minimums are
different. Shareholders in Ireland are called members.43 Public
companies must have a minimum of two members44 and private
companies must have a minimum of one member and a maximum of
fifty members with an exception for current and former employees. 45
Member meetings must occur at least once every calendar year and
meetings cannot be more than fifteen months apart.46 Shares in public
companies are freely transferable whereas shares in private companies
may be transferred only with board approval.47
With regard to board composition, all companies must have at
least two directors and one secretary, though one person can
simultaneously act as both a director and a secretary. 48 The secretary
need not be a natural person-often an accounting firm acts as this
board member.49 Collectively, the directors and the secretary are the
officers of the company.50 Directors have almost unlimited powers to
exercise the objects of the company; they are limited only by the
fiduciary nature of their position, which may be further restricted by
the Articles of Association and shareholder resolutions. 5' In Ireland,
shareholder derivative suits are "uncommon and difficult to sustain." 52
41. MCGRATH, supra note 19, at 275-79.
42. Id. at 49.
43. Id. at 186.
44. EGAN, supra note 15, at 31.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 33.
47. McGRATH, supra note 19, at 27, 224.
48. Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) §§ 174-75.
49. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 58.
50. Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) § 2.
51. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 46-47.
52. Tomran I, 862 A.2d 453, 466 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
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Instead, if a director's failure to properly oversee the company leads to
insolvency, the director may be personally liable for the debts of the
company.53 Irish law has no mandatory requirements for board
meetings,54 though each year one-third of the directors must offer to
resign. 55
The secretary is usually the chief administrative officer and holds
the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the company. 56 The
secretary's functions are wide-ranging but ill-defined: he is obligated
to fully oversee the administration of the company, including its
compliance with the Companies Acts. Perhaps the secretary's most
important legal duty is to make and file the annual return with the
Registrar of Companies. 57
Irish companies have a number of involuntary stakeholders in a
"pre-bankruptcy system"f58 designed to save companies rather than see
them fold. A court may appoint an examiner when a company is
unlikely to have the ability to pay its debts. Appointment of an
examiner is intended to save a company before a receiver or liquidator
is appointed. 59 The examiner's goal is to give a distressed company
"breathing space," akin to the protection provided by a Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the United States.60 The examiner researches the affairs
of the company and reports to the court whether he thinks the
company can continue as a going concern and what changes are
necessary to achieve that goal. The court may order the examiner to
take over management from the board. 61 Debenture-holders whose
debt has fallen into arrears can ask a court to appoint a receiver. 62 The
receiver's task is to sell the attached assets and pay off the
debenture.63 The appointment of a receiver suspends the directors'
53. Companies Act, 1990 (Act No. 33/1990) (Ir.) § 204.
54. EGAN, supra note 15, at 22.
55. MCGRATH, supra note 19, at 114.
56. Id. at 101-02.
57. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 230.
58. See Fannon, supra note 4, at 244.
59. MCGRATH, supra note 19, at 300.
60. Id.; see ll U.S.C. §§ 101-1527.
61. MCGRATH, supra note 19, at 346.
62. Id. at 300-01.
63. Id. at 300.
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powers with regard to the charged asset.64 The receiver is a fiduciary
not to the company but to the debenture-holder; his duty to the
company is only to report a "statement of affairs.",65 The appointment
of a receiver is often the last step before bankruptcy. 6 6 When a
company is bankrupt, a court appoints a liquidator, 67 except in the
case of voluntary liquidations, in which the company appoints its own
liquidator. 68 In either case, the liquidator is a fiduciary to the company
who must sell the company's assets, pay the company's debts, and
distribute any surplus to shareholders.6 9
B. European Corporate Law
EU legislation takes the form of regulations and directives.
Regulations are enforceable in all Member States,7 0 while directives
merely require that Member States achieve a certain goal without
dictating how that goal should be obtained.7 1 The European Union
also issues recommendations and various other guidelines, notices,
and resolutions, all of which do not have binding legal force. 72 Current
EU corporate law is comprised of three regulations,7 3 thirteen
directives or proposals for directives,74 and three recommendations.75
64. Id. at 306.
65. Id. at 305-06.
66. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 199.
67. Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) § 225.
68. Id. §§ 258, 275.
69. MCGRATH, supra note 19, at 364, 380-8 1.
70. RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 30 (2005);
FOSTER, supra note 8, at 90.
71. FOLSOM, supra note 70, at 31; FOSTER, supra note 8, at 90.
72. FOLSOM, supra note 70, at 30; FOSTER, supra note 8, at 92.
73. See Council Regulation 2137/85, European Economic Interest Grouping,
1985 O.J. (L 199) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 2157/2001, Statute for a European
Company, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EU); Council Regulation 1606/2002, Application of
International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EU).
74. See First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 O.J. (L 065) 8 (EC); Second
Council Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 026) 1 (EC); Third Council Directive 78/855,
1978 O.J. (L 295) 36 (EC); Fourth Council Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11
(EC); Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2 (EC); Sixth
Council Directive 82/891, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47 (EC); Seventh Council Directive
83/349, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1 (EC); Eighth Council Directive 84/253, 1984 O.J. (L
9
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While corporations must still incorporate in Member States, the
European Union has taken steps towards a "European Company." 76 In
1985, a little-used company form called the European Economic
Interest Grouping (EEIG) became the first supranational business
entity in Europe.77 The EEIG allowed a framework for independent
companies to cooperate, but it "gained only limited importance. 78 In
2001, the European Union passed a regulation creating the European
Company or "Societas Europaea" (SE).79 An SE may operate
throughout Europe on the basis of one legal and administrative
regulation, but starting an SE is difficult as the company must have a
minimum share capital of C120,000 and the SE must emerge from a
pre-existing Member State-incorporated company.80
One other regulation affecting European corporations mandates
that publicly traded companies meet International Accounting
Standards Board regulations when preparing public accounts. 81
Further, EU accounting directives regulate a wide range of corporate
behavior, including: disclosure of a company's constitutional
documents; minimum capital requirements for public companies;
Member State laws governing mergers and divisions; the layout and
content of balance sheets and profit and loss statements; preparation of
126) 20 (EC); Proposal for a Tenth Directive of the Council, 1985 (C 23) 11 (EC);
Eleventh Council Directive 89/666, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36 (EC); Twelfth Council
Company Law Directive 89/667, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40 (EC); Proposal for a
Thirteenth European Parliament and Council Directive, 1996 (C 162) 5 (EC);
Proposal for a Fourteenth Directive on Liquidation (unofficially published in Lutter,
Europaisches Unternehmensrecht 302 if).
75. Commission Recommendation 256/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 91) 91 (EC);
Commission Recommendation 453/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 156) 33 (EC); Commission
Recommendation 590/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 191) 22 (EC).
76. Andreas Kellerhals & Dirk Truten, The Creation of the European
Company, 17 TuL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 71, 75 (2002).
77. See Council Regulation 2137/85, European Economic Interest Grouping,
1985 O.J. (L 199) 1 (EC).
78. Kellerhals & Truten, supra note 76, at 75.
79. See Council Regulation 2157/2001, Statute for a European Company, 2001
O.J. (L 294) 1 (EU); Council Directive 2001/86, Supplementing the Statute for a
European Company With Regard to the Involvement of Employees, 2001 O.J. (L
294) 22 (EC).
80. Kellerhals & Truten, supra note 76, at 72, 77-78.
81. Council Regulation 1606/2002, Application of International Accounting
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EU).
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consolidated accounts for companies with subsidiaries; qualifications
for auditors; rules for branches of companies operating in other
Member States; and the existence of single member private limited
liability companies. 82 Finally, recommendations call for quality
assurance systems for statutory audits; recognition, measurement, and
disclosure of environmental issues; and propose fundamental
principles for statutory auditors.83
1II. SCANDALS
The previous section summarized the legal playing field in which
numerous corporate scandals occurred. While accounting scandals in
the United States are well known on both sides of the Atlantic, 84 most
Americans and much of the Irish public are unaware of the instances
of corporate malfeasance on the eastern side of the Atlantic. The
scandals described here served as catalysts for drastic legal changes in
Ireland and throughout Europe.
82. See sources cited supra note 74.
83. See sources cited supra note 75.
84. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005); John Paul Lucci,
Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REv. 211 (2003); Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on
Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate
Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 163 (2003); Robert
W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1
(2003); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on
Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911 (2003);
Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward:
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REv. 1
(2007); Clyde Stoltenberg et al., A Comparative Analysis of Post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporate Governance Developments in the US and European Union: The Impact
of Tensions Created by Extraterritorial Application of Section 404, 53 AM. J. COMP.
L. 457 (2005); Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate
Governance in the European Union-A Plan to Move Forward, at 5, COM (2003)
284 final (May 21, 2003) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adopted on 30 July 2002 in the
wave of a series of scandals. .. .") (emphasis added).
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A. Irish Scandals-Elan & Allied Irish Banks
Though headquartered in New York City and San Diego, Elan
Corporation is an Irish pharmaceutical company by virtue of its place
of incorporation.85 It focuses on discovering and selling drugs for
neurological, autoimmune, and pain management purposes.86 In its
2002 annual report, Elan reduced its 2001 income by $73 million and
its cash flow by more than $500 million.8 7 Elan's market
capitalization fell 97% from $20 billion in June 2001 to $600 million
just over a year later.88 Elan became the target of a 2004 securities
class action lawsuit in which plaintiffs estimated that Elan inflated
revenue by $648.8 million between 1999 and 2001.89 Plaintiffs alleged
that
Elan inflated its revenues and earnings through several
manipulative accounting schemes, most of which involved Elan
investing monies in, or loaning monies to, other entities (e.g., joint
business ventures) which then funneled the same monies back to
Elan by "purchasing" Elan products or licenses. The common
thread among these schemes was that all of the initial funding that
Elan conveyed to the separate entities was immediately returned to
Elan and booked as revenue, while Elan booked its payments to the
entities as capital investments or loans. 90
This accounting practice, called "roundtripping," came in four
schemes: Joint Business Ventures (JBVs), a product rationalization
program, risk sharing arrangements, and Special Purpose Entities
(SPEs).91
Elan inflated sales income by entering into JBVs with third
parties. Elan contributed money to the JBVs which the JBVs then used
85. In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig. (Elan 1), No. 02 Civ. 865, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9913, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2004).
86. Id. at*1.
87. Id.at*3n.l.
88. Shame About the Name, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002.
89. Elan I, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9913, at *14; In re Elan Sec. Litig. (Elan
I), 385 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
90. Elan I, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
91. Elan I, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9913 at *6-7.
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to purchase a license from Elan for medical technology.9 2 Elan
subsequently recorded the money received from the sale of the
licenses as income, and used the JBVs to shift substantial research and
development expenses to other entities.93 In its product rationalization
program, Elan sold drug royalties to third parties, which paid for the
royalties with funds provided by Elan, and Elan recognized income
from the sale of royalties without recording the expense of financing
the transaction.94 Elan also recognized the entire amount of income
from the sale in the year the sale took place rather than spreading the
income over the length of the royalty contract.95 In its risk-sharing
arrangements, Elan financed its research and development by selling
royalty rights for products under development. 96 Elan characterized
the money it received as sales when in fact the funds were
reimbursements for research and development costs already
incurred. 97 In a variation of the JBV scheme, Elan sold the stock of its
subsidiaries to three SPEs at great profit.98 The SPEs did not have
cash to buy the securities so they recorded debt for the purchases,
while Elan recorded profit on the sale, even though it never received
cash. 99 In 2000 and 2001, Elan recorded gains of $40 million on the
sale of securities. 00 Elan further guaranteed the SPE debt, but did not
record the guarantees as debt on its own balance sheet. 101
In addition to the roundtripping schemes, Elan had an ingenious
executive compensation scheme that defrauded shareholders out of
$20 million. 0 2 Elan paid "royalties" to a company called Monksland,
which distributed its good fortune to its own shareholders, all of
whom were Elan executives. 0 3 With Monksland as a conduit, Elan
92. Id. at *7.
93. Id. at *8-9.
94. Id. at *9-10.
95. Id. Elan's income recognition scheme violated SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin 101. Id. at *9.
96. Id.at*10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *12-13.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *13-14.
103. Id.
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conveyed cash to executives without disclosing the compensation to
shareholders. 0 4 On the basis of this behavior, in April of 2005, the
court approved a $75 million class action settlement. 0 5
In a scandal nine times larger than the Elan debacle, the $691
million lost at Allied Irish Banks (AIB) set the standard for European
bank scandals until the 2008 trading fiasco at French bank Soci6t6
G6n6rale pushed European bank scandals into the billions. 10 6 At
Allfirst Bank, a wholly-owned AIB subsidiary in Maryland, rogue
trader John M. Rusnak lost millions in currency arbitrage. 10 7
According to AIB's investigation,
The fraud was carefully planned and meticulously implemented
by Mr. Rusnak, extended over a lengthy period of time, and
involved falsification of key bank records and documents.
Mr. Rusnak circumvented the controls that were intended to
prevent any such fraud by manipulating the weak control
environment in Allfirst's treasury; notably, he found ways of
circumventing changes in control procedures throughout the period
of his fraud.
Mr. Rusnak's trading activities did not receive the careful
scrutiny that they deserved; the Allfirst treasurer and his treasury
funds manager-the principal persons responsible for Mr. Rusnak's
supervision-failed for an extended period to monitor Mr.
Rusnak's trading.
At both the AIB Group and Allfirst levels, the Asset and
Liability Committees ("ALCOs"), risk managers, senior
management and Allfirst internal auditors, all did not appreciate the
risks associated with Mr. Rusnak's hedge-fund style of foreign
exchange trading; even in the absence of any sign of fraudulent
conduct, the mere scope of Mr. Rusnak's trading activities and the
size of the positions he was taking warranted a much closer risk-
management review.
104. Id.
105. In re Elan Sec. Litig. (Elan I), 385 F. Supp. 2d 363, 377 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
106. A lone trader, J6r6me Kerviel, was accused of losing E4.9 billion by
taking unauthorized positions on futures linked to European stock markets. Le
Rogue Trader, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2008.
107. Tomran, Inc. v. Passano (Tomran 1), 862 A.2d 453, 455 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004).
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Allfirst and AIB senior management heavily relied upon the
Allfirst treasurer, given the treasurer's extensive experience with
treasury functions and foreign exchange trading in particular. In
hindsight, this heavy reliance proved misplaced.
Nothing has come to attention during the course of the review
that indicates that anyone at AIB or Allfirst, outside of the Allfirst
treasury group, were [sic] involved in, or had any knowledge that,
fraudulent or improper trading activity was occurring at Allfirst
before the discovery of the fraud. 108
An AIB shareholder, Tomran, Inc., 10 9 filed a derivative suit alleging
that AIB and Allfirst directors "were negligent and grossly negligent
in their oversight of Rusnak, which resulted in the loss to Allfirst
108. Press Release, Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., AIB and Allfirst Implement
Actions to Address Issues Raised by Fraudulent Trading Activities (Mar. 14, 2002),
available at http://www.aib.ie/servletlContentServer?pagename=AIBInvestor_
Relation s/AIBPressReleas/aib d press releases&c=AIBPressReleas&cid=101
5597171590&channel=HP.
109. Tomran actually held American Depository Receipts instead of shares.
Tomran I, 862 A.2d at 455.
An ADR is a receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents
a specified amount of a foreign security that has been deposited with a
foreign branch or agent of the depositary, known as the custodian. The
holder of an ADR is not the title owner of the underlying shares; the title
owner of the underlying shares is either the depositary, the custodian, or
their agent. ADRs are tradeable [sic] in the same manner as any other
registered American security, may be listed on any of the major exchanges
in the United States or traded over the counter, and are subject to the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This makes trading an ADR simpler
and more secure for American investors than trading in the underlying
security in the foreign market.
ADRs may be either sponsored or unsponsored. An unsponsored ADR
is established with little or no involvement of the issuer of the underlying
security. A sponsored ADR, in contrast, is established with the active
participation of the issuer of the underlying security. An issuer who
sponsors an ADR enters into an agreement with the depositary bank and
the ADR owners. The agreement establishes the terms of the ADRs and
the rights and obligations of the parties, such as the ADR holders' voting
rights.
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
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Bank." 0 Tomran sought money damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief.'"' The Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed the suit,
holding that Irish law does not provide for shareholder derivative
suits. I12
Rusnak pleaded guilty to bank fraud and was sentenced to seven
and one-half years in prison. 113 He was also ordered to repay the $691
million in monthly increments of $1000, a rate at which it would take
him 57,583 years to fully repay his debt." 4
B. European Scandals-Ahold and Parmalat
Dutch food retailer Royal Ahold N.V. (Ahold) has been described
as Europe's Enron.' 15 "Like many American firms during the bubble
years, Ahold started to bend the accounting rules, claiming profits of
acquired firms as 'organic growth,' booking capital gains from sale-
and-leaseback deals as profit, and keeping billions in debt off its
balance sheet."' 6 In February of 2003, Ahold announced that "it was
restating its reported earnings by $500 million for fiscal years 2001
and 2002 due to a series of accounting inaccuracies related to
promotional allowances" at its American subsidiary, U.S.
Foodservice, Inc. (USF).117 As a result, Ahold's stock price dropped
more than sixty percent." 8 In 2002, Ahold had losses of $1.4 billion
and in 2003, it wrote off $3.1 billion in debt related to USF."19 Two
accounting practices in particular caused most of Ahold's problems:
110. Tomran 1, 862 A.2d at 456. AIB, Allfirst, and Rusnak were also sued for
violating American securities laws. Linn v. Allied Irish Banks, PLC, No. 02-CV-
1738(DAB), 2004 WL 2813133 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2004).
111. Tomran I, 862 A.2d at 455.
112. Tomran, Inc. v. Passano (Tomran 11), 891 A.2d 336, 342 (Md. 2006).
113. Ex-Currency Trader Sentenced to Seven and a Half Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2003, at C14.
114. 57,583, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2003, at E2.
115. Europe's Enron, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2003.
116. Id.
117. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 344
(D. Md. 2004).
118. Id. at 344-45, 348.
119. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Royal Ahold Writes Off $3.1 Billion On Md. Unit,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at El.
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improperly booking income from vendor rebates and inflating revenue
from joint ventures. 120 USF prematurely booked rebate revenue and
colluded with vendors to falsely inflate rebate amounts.' 21 In its joint
venture scheme, Ahold attributed the entire revenue from five joint
ventures to itself when it only should have recorded revenue
proportionate to its ownership of the ventures. 122 Ahold restated its
revenue downward for 2001 and 2002 by $24.8 billion. 123
Perhaps to underscore the paradigm set by the Houston energy
company Enron, the accounting problems at Italian dairy giant
Parmalat Finanziaria SpA (Parmalat) have also been described as
Europe's Enron. 124 The company understated debt by $10 billion and
overstated assets by $16.4 billion.' 25 Parmalat's problems stemmed
from a need for continual cash infusions to cover losses in certain
South American ventures, to service debt, and to fund the lifestyle of
CEO Calisto Tanzi and his family. 126 To obtain cash from banks, the
company had to look healthy; to look healthy, Parmalat either engaged
in complex transactions with its 130 subsidiaries 27 or told outright
lies, at one point booking a fictitious sale of $620 million worth of
powdered milk to Cuba.' 28 In a typical transaction, Parmalat would
send a phony invoice to a subsidiary and would subsequently record
an accounts receivable asset. 129 It would then sell the subsidiary's debt
to banks in exchange for cash. ' 30 When the bank sought payment from
the subsidiary, Parmalat lent the subsidiary cash, recording the
transaction as an investment in a subsidiary rather than a loan.' 3 ' The
bank loans Parmalat obtained meant more debt to service which
120. RoyalAhold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 344-45.
121. Id. at 345.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, WASH.
POST, Jan. 10, 2004, at Al.
125. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
126. Id. at 283.
127. Goodman, supra note 124.
128. Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 283-84.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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required more cash infusions.' 32 Parmalat issued bonds thirty-five
times between 1995 and 2003, creating $5 billion of debt.133 As stated
by the United States District Court in a 2005 securities suit, "Parmalat
and its confederates were operating something akin to a Ponzi
scheme." 1
34
In accordance with Italian law, Parmalat switched auditors from
Grant Thornton to Deloitte & Touche in 1999.135 To hide its fraud
from Deloitte, Parmalat assigned its fraudulent transactions to its
Caribbean-based subsidiary Bonlat, which was still audited by Grant
Thornton. 136 Parmalat's scheme collapsed under its own weight in late
2003, when the company was unable to pay bonds, its stock lost half
its value, trading was suspended for a few days, and the company
announced that a Bank of America account ostensibly worth $4.9
billion did not actually exist. 137 It filed for bankruptcy on December
24, 2003.138
C. American Scandals
Perhaps the best known bankruptcy, though not the largest, 39
involved Houston-based energy trader Enron Corporation. Enron hid
assets and liabilities in over 2000 business entities, many of which
were wholly-owned special purpose entities that were not included on
Enron's financial statements.140 Enron booked cash it received from
loans as revenue and then sold the loan debt to an SPE, again
132. Id. at 283.
133. Goodman, supra note 124.
134. Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. WorldCom's bankruptcy filing in 2002 was the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig. 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Retirement Systems of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir.
2004). Enron had pre-bankruptcy assets of $63 billion, making it the second largest
bankruptcy behind WorldCom, which had pre-bankruptcy assets of $104 billion. See
BankruptcyData.com, The 15 Largest Bankruptcies 1980-Present, http://www.
bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
140. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 8-9.
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recording revenue from the sale. 141 In its November 2001 bankruptcy,
Enron restated earnings and debt for the years 1997 through 2000.142 It
reduced earnings by $28 million for 1997, $133 million for 1998,
$153 million for 1999, and $91 million for 2000.143 It increased debt
by returning liabilities held in SPEs back to its own balance sheet by
$711 million for 1997, $561 million for 1998, $685 million for 1999,
and $628 million for 2000.144 In that time period, "[n]early a third of
Enron's reported income came from misclassification of transactions
as revenues." 145 Even before Enron's bankruptcy, its auditor, Arthur
Andersen, LLP (Andersen), had classified Enron "as a 'maximum
risk' client-meaning that it adopted and used the most aggressive
permissible accounting principles."'
146
For its part, Andersen is the common denominator of corporate
malfeasance in the United States, because it served as auditor to
numerous malfeasant companies, including WorldCom, 147 Qwest,148
and Global Crossing. 149 But its greatest entanglements, and greatest
conflicts, were with Enron.1 50 According to the plaintiffs in an Enron
securities lawsuit, Andersen was "not independent" of Enron,
15 1
generating in excess of $50 million in annual fees from the Houston
energy company, which was Andersen's second largest client.
1 52
Indeed, Andersen served as both internal and external auditor to Enron
and generated more revenue from consulting services ($27 million)
141. Id. at 9.
142. Cherie J. Owen, Board Games: Germany's Monopoly on the Two-Tier
System of Corporate Governance and Why the Post-Enron United States Would
Benefit From its Adoption, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 167, 170 (2003).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 12.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 22; In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
148. Jennings, supra note 84, at 215; In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 626 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
149. Jennings, supra note 84, at 215; Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
150. See Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74.
151. Id. at 673.
152. Id.
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than from auditing services ($25 million).153 The plaintiffs further
alleged that over 300 accounting and finance positions at Enron were
filled with former Andersen auditors and professionals, a fact that
provided comfort to Enron because it knew that Andersen would be
less likely to question improper accounting if done by former
employees. 154 After a conviction for obstruction of justice for
shredding Enron-related documents, 155 Andersen ceased to be an
auditor of public companies and shut down completely soon after.
56
Virginia-based telecom giant WorldCom, Inc., became the largest
bankruptcy in United States history when it restated earnings
downward by $3.8 billion in June 2002.157 By booking cash expenses
as capital investments, WorldCom kept the asset side of its balance
sheet even, despite the fact that it was spending cash.' 58 Once it
emerged from bankruptcy, WorldCom had a market capitalization of
less than $1 billion, 115 times below its highest value. 5 9 It also
changed its name to MCI.
Both Qwest Communications International Inc. (Qwest), the
dominant local phone company in fourteen states from Minnesota to
Washington, and Global Crossing, Ltd., the builder of an underwater
fiber optic network that provided cross-continental Internet access,
engaged in a scheme of "swapping" capacity for accounting
purposes. 16 Swapping with Global Crossing and Enron, 161 Qwest was
caught with $1.16 billion improperly listed as current profits rather
than capital investments. 62 While making its restatement in 2002,
Qwest wrote off $20 to $30 billion in intangible assets. 163 Global
153. Jennings, supra note 84, at 213-14.
154. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
155. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 8.
156. Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at C3.
157. See sources cited supra note 139.
158. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 21.
159. Owen, supra note 142, at 170.
160. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 674 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
161. Id.
162. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 24.
163. Id.
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Crossing filed for bankruptcy in January 2002 because it failed to earn
any real revenue.'1 64
The first disclosure that Adelphia Communications Co. had $2.2
billion in unreported off-balance sheet liabilities was buried in a
footnote to a press release announcing its 2001 fourth quarter and full-
year results. 65 One of the largest cable television providers in the
country before its bankruptcy, the company announced in June 2002
that it had $500 million less in revenue than it had previously reported
over the prior two years.166 Various members of the controlling Rigas
family were charged with securities fraud 67 and the company filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, claiming $18.6 billion in debt.168
Manufacturing conglomerate Tyco International, Ltd.'s $4 billion
in profit in each of 2000 and 2001 came crashing down with a
reported loss of over $9 billion in 2002.169 Tyco lost $100 billion in
market capitalization and its CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, was indicted on
thirty-five counts of various white collar crimes. 170 Kozlowski, along
with CFO Mark H. Swartz, "stole more than $100 million in three
'bonus' larcenies in 1999 and 2000 and many millions more in other
thefts" for which they were sentenced to eight to twenty-five years in
prison. 171
Samuel Waksal, CEO of ImClone Systems, Inc., learned on
Christmas Day 2001 that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
planned to reject ImClone's application for approval of the cancer
164. See Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1535,
1540-41 (2002).
165. United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2007).
166. Id.; Hamilton, supra note 84, at 23.
167. Rigas, 490 F.3d at 214.
168. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 23-25.
169. Ezra Charitable Trust v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 466 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2006).
170. See Hamilton, supra note 84, at 26. The indictment is available at
http://fl l.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/tyco/nykozlowski912O2ind.pdf
(last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
171. People v. Kozlowski, 846 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (App. Div. 2007)
(upholding convictions of Dennis Kozlowski and Mark H. Swartz); see also Jennifer
Bayot, Ex-Tyco Executives Sentenced to 8 1/3 to 25 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2005.
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drug Erbitux.' 72 When the market opened on the following day,
Waksal along with his family and friends began selling ImClone
shares.'73 Two days later, ImClone publicly announced the FDA
rejection and its share price dropped from $70 to $10.174 Waksal and
his friends saved $9 million by selling ImClone shares prior to the
public announcement. 175 While Waksal was caught and eventually
pleaded guilty to insider trading,' 76 one of his friends, lifestyle
doyenne Martha Stewart, was convicted of obstruction of justice for
lying to authorities about her sale of ImClone stock.1 77 Her
punishment included a five-month prison term,1 78 but of more
immediate impact was her paper loss of $186 million within thirty
minutes of the guilty verdict when the share price of Martha Stewart
Living Omnimedia dropped from $17 to $10.86.179
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO SCANDALS
A. Irish Response-CLEA and CAAA
Prior to 2001, Ireland had scant corporate governance regulation.
Under Section 150 of the Companies Act, 1990, a court could ban
misbehaving directors from directing any company for five years. 80
Section 160 was even harsher on those convicted of crimes involving
companies; they were automatically banned from acting as a board
member, auditor, or serving as an involuntary controller. 18 Yet
beyond the criminal code and the concomitant civil penalties, Ireland
lacked a way to enforce norms of corporate behavior. The need for
172. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 28-29.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 29.
177. David Glovin, Judge Refuses to Cut Stewart's Detention, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 2005, at E 1.
178. Id.
179. Neil Irwin, For the Stewart Brand, an Uncertain Future, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 2004, at A4.
180. Companies Act, 1990 (Act No. 33/1990) (Ir.) § 150. Commonly known as
a "Section 150 Order."
181. Id. § 160.
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enforcement was obvious: when it came to filing corporate
compliance returns, just thirteen percent of 136,000 companies did
so. 182 Ireland needed a watchdog, which it received in 2001 with the
passage of the Company Law Enforcement Act (CLEA).
The CLEA created the Director of Corporate Enforcement (DCE),
a regulator with broad powers over Irish companies.' 83 The DCE was
given the power to investigate and prosecute breaches of the
Companies Acts,' 84 supervise the activity of liquidators and
receivers,185 demand to see a company's minutes without reason,
186
and demand to see any other books or documents if he suspects
fraud. 187 Companies must inform the DCE of the appointment of a
receiver.1 88 The DCE can petition a court for search warrants and has
the police power to search a dwelling. 189 Failing to comply with a
DCE document request, submitting false or misleading documents to
the DCE, and destroying documents are criminal offenses under the
CLEA.190 The DCE can also petition for the disqualification of a
director by seeking a Section 150 Order.'
9 1
The DCE has power over numerous corporate actors. Since an
individual who has filed for bankruptcy cannot serve as a director,
92
the DCE can require a director whom he reasonably believes to be
bankrupt to make a statement of his personal financial position. 193 The
court has the power to freeze the assets of an officer if the court thinks
the officer might frustrate a civil judgment by disposing of his own or
company assets.' 94 Application for such an order may be made by
182. Brian Walker, Company Directors: All is About to Change! The New
Company Law Enforcement Act of 2001, 8 COMM. L. PRACT. 151, 151 (2001). -
183. Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001 (Act No. 28/2001) (Jr.) § 7.
184. Id. § 12(a), (c).
185. Id. § 12(e).
186. Id. § 19.
187. Id. §29.
188. Id. § 52.
189. Id. § 30.
190. Id. § 29.
191. Id. § 40; see also Companies Act, 1990 (Act No. 33/1990) (1r.) §§ 150,
159-60.
192. Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) § 183.
193. Company Law Enforcement Act § 40.
194. Id. § 55.
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companies, directors, shareholders, creditors, receivers, liquidators, or
the DCE. 195 Prior to the CLEA, Irish courts had the power to examine
directors' conduct only during involuntary wind-ups.1 96 With the
passing of the CLEA, courts and the DCE can supervise even
voluntary wind-ups.197 The court may order inspection of a company's
books and may order a director to make a statement to the court
concerning any company property he may have in his possession or
any debts he owes to the company.198 The director may not refuse to
answer for fear of self-incrimination. 99 The liquidator of a bankrupt
company must apply for Section 150 Orders for the removal of all of a
company's directors, regardless of who was actually responsible for
the bankruptcy.200 If a liquidator uncovers a criminal offense during
the course of his work, he must report it to both the state criminal
prosecutor and the DCE.20 1 The DCE can demand to see liquidators'
work regardless of the solvency of the winding-up company. 20 2 The
DCE has oversight of liquidators and of their professional bodies.20 3
The CLEA also imposes obligations directly on directors and
secretaries, including the obligation to "ensure that the requirements
of the Companies Acts are complied with by the company."
20 4
Auditors also face DCE oversight because the DCE can demand
to see the qualifications of an auditor and the failure to produce such
qualifications is a criminal offense.20 5 Accounting bodies must report
evidence of a member's breach of the Companies Acts. 20 6 Similar to
SOX's "report up, report out" requirement for lawyers,20 7 Irish
195. Id.
196. Companies Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) § 245.
197. Company Law Enforcement Act § 49.
198. Id. §§ 43, 49.
199. Id. §§ 44, 49.
200. Id. § 56.
201. Id. § 51. In Ireland, criminal prosecutions are handled by the Director of
Public Prosecutions. See id.
202. Id. § 57.
203. Id. §§ 56-57.
204. Id. § 100.
205. Id. § 72.
206. Id. § 73.
207. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2005).
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auditors who reasonably believe that a company or director has broken
the Companies Acts must report that belief to the DCE.2 °8
While the CLEA predates SOX, the Companies (Auditing &
Accounting) Act 2003 (CAAA) has firm roots in the U.S. legislation.
Just as SOX established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, the CAAA established the Irish Auditing and Accounting
Supervisory Authority (IAASA). 20 9 The mandate of the IAASA is to
supervise how accounting bodies monitor and regulate their members,
to promote adherence to professional standards in the accounting
industry, to monitor whether companies' accountings comply with the
Companies Acts, and to serve as a source of advice to the Minister for
Enterprise, Trade and Employment. 2 0 To carry out its mandate, the
IAASA is empowered with the authority to: recognize accounting
bodies; approve accountants' investigatory procedures, constitutions,
and bylaws; oversee any investigations that accounting bodies may
undertake; sanction those bodies that do not comply with approved
investigatory procedures; investigate and sanction breaches of
accounting standards; and review companies' annual accounts. 211 The
IAASA also has the power to review a company's accounting if it
questions whether that accounting complies with any of the
Companies Acts.212 If the IAASA finds accounting irregularities, it
can petition the court to force a company to revise its accounts. 21 3
The CAAA does not go as far as SOX in barring auditors from
doing non-audit consulting; it only requires companies to disclose
what they paid their auditor for both audit and non-audit work.214
Directors must prepare statements that describe their company's
internal financial procedures for securing compliance with the
Companies Acts, Irish tax law, and "any other enactments that provide
a legal framework within which the company operates and that may
208. Company Law Enforcement Act § 74.
209. Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act, 2003 (Act No. 44/2003) (Ir.) §
5(1).
210. Id. § 8(1).
211. ld.§9.
212. Id. § 26(3).
213. Id. § 26(6).
214. Id. § 44.
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materially affect the company's financial statements., 215 Directors
must then acknowledge that they are responsible for securing
compliance and whether "they are of the opinion that they used all
reasonable endeavors to secure the company's compliance with its
relevant obligations .. .."216 Auditors then review the directors'
statements and decide if they are "fair and reasonable., 217
Companies must include in their annual accounting a statement as
to whether their accounts have been prepared in accordance with
"applicable accounting standards." 21 8 If their accounting does not
comply with those standards, the company must include a statement
describing the material departures, the effects of any departures, and
the reasons for such departures. 21 9 Failure to include such a statement
is a criminal offense.22 ° Companies must disclose the accounting
policies they followed in determining the numbers on their balance
sheets and profit and loss statements.221
Section 42 of the CAAA requires that every public company
establish an audit committee that must review the company's accounts
for compliance with applicable accounting standards; monitor the
performance and quality of the auditor's work and independence from
the company; and report to the board of directors its choice of auditor
and its recommendation on awarding non-audit work, though the
ultimate choice of auditor still lies with the board as a whole.222 The
audit committee must have at least two members, and these members
may not be current or recent employees of the company.223
215. Id. § 45.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 41
219. Id. This provision is often referred as the "Comply or Explain"
requirement. It contrasts with what is commonly known as the "Comply or Else"
provision found in Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 302. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
220. Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act § 41.
221. Id. §43.
222. Id. § 42.
223. Id. The Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act bars those who have
been employees of the company within the last three years from serving on the audit
committee. Id.
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B. EU Response
On May 21, 2003, the European Commission issued a report
entitled "Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate
Governance in the European Union."224 This report, commonly called
the "Action Plan," contains proposals for legislative and non-
legislative action that the European Union plans to implement over the
coming years. The Commission concluded that there was no need for
a Europe-wide corporate governance code. It instead proposed that the
EU's role in improving corporate governance was to facilitate
convergence and exchange of best practices.225 The Action Plan
addressed ways to enhance corporate governance disclosure,
strengthen shareholders' rights, modernize the board of directors, and
coordinate Member State corporate governance efforts.
The Action Plan proposed that public companies include a
statement of their corporate governance structure in their annual
reports. The statement should include a list of shareholders' rights, a
description of how the board and its committees operate, a list of
major shareholders and how their ownership affects voting and control
rights, disclosure of any other relationships between the company and
these major shareholders, disclosure of material transactions with
other related parties, and disclosure of the existence and nature of a
risk management system.226 The Action Plan further proposed that
institutional investors should be required to disclose their investment
policy and their policy on exercising voting rights, and to disclose,
when beneficiaries ask, how the voting rights were exercised.227 The
Action Plan then proposed that companies use electronic means to
send relevant information to shareholders in advance of shareholder
224. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in
the European Union-A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21,
2003) [hereinafter Action Plan]. The Action Plan addresses corporate governance,
capital maintenance and alteration, groups and pyramids, corporate restructuring and
mobility, the European private company, the European Co-operative Society, and
other EU legal forms of enterprise, and enhancing the transparency of national legal
forms of enterprise. Id. While the Action Plan covers many subjects important to
corporate law, this article only reviews those relevant to corporate governance.
225. Id. at 11-12.
226. Id. at 12-14.
227. Id. at 13.
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meetings in order to allow shareholders to more effectively exercise
their rights to ask questions, to table resolutions, and to participate and
vote electronically when absent. 228 The Commission suggested that an
EU directive would best solve the legal difficulties involved in
implementing the plan and stated that such a directive was a short-
term priority. 2
29
The Action Plan proposed that independent directors should make
decisions where executive directors have conflicts of interest,
particularly in the areas of director remuneration and audit
supervision, and the Commission further suggested that shareholders
should receive information regarding individual directors'
remuneration and that shareholders should give final approval of any
director stock compensation. 230 To force the necessary collective
responsibility on directors for financial statements and the annual
corporate governance statement, the Commission proposed that the
European Union adopt a recommendation providing for enhanced
responsibilities.23' Similarly, the Commission stated its support for
other recommendations intended to increase director responsibilities,
including granting shareholders who hold a certain percentage of
shares a special investigation right into the affairs of the company,
holding directors personally liable for failing to adequately deal with
the company's debts, and requiring the disqualification of directors
throughout the European Union for issuing misleading company
statements.232
The Action Plan's final major suggestion was the implementation
of a European Corporate Governance Forum to serve as a
clearinghouse for coordination and convergence of Member State
governance laws. 233 Unlike the other proposals in the Action Plan, the
Forum actually came into existence on October 18, 2004,234 though
228. Id. at 13-14.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 15-16.
231. Id. at 16.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 17.
234. See Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, Corporate
Governance: Commission Creates European Forum to Promote Convergence in
Europe (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
28
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despite meeting numerous times it has made only one substantive
recommendation: that the European Union adopt a directive that
would make cross-border shareholder voting easier.
235
Beyond the Action Plan, the Commission adopted
recommendations on directors' remuneration 236 and on the role of
independent directors on listed companies' boards.23 7 The former
recommends that Member States force companies to disclose their
policy on remuneration and inform shareholders how much money
individual directors earn, and seeks to ensure that shareholders are
given adequate control over these matters and over share-based
remuneration schemes. 238 The latter focuses on the role of non-
executive or supervisory directors in key areas where executive or
managing directors may have conflicts of interest, and recommends
minimum standards for the qualifications, commitment, and
independence of non-executive or supervisory directors.2 39
The European Union has adopted two directives regarding
accounting practices. On May 31, 2001, the European Union adopted
a directive mandating that Member States permit or require the use of
fair value valuation methods to account for certain classes of financial
instruments in companies' annual financial statements.240 This
directive will enable European companies to prepare annual financial
statements in accordance with international developments. Companies
will be required to provide additional information in the notes to the
accounts on the items that have been valued at fair value. 24 1 On June
Action.do?reference=IP/04/1241 &format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en.
235. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Exercise of Voting Rights by Shareholders of Companies
Having Their Registered Office in a Member State and Whose Shares are Admitted
to Trading on a Regulated Market, COM (2005) 685 final (Jan. 5, 2006).
236. Commission Recommendation 2004/913, Fostering an Appropriate
Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies, 2004 O.J. (L 385)
55 (EC).
237. Commission Recommendation 2005/162, On the Role of Non-Executive
or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Board, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51 (EC).
238. See 2004 O.J. (L 385) 55, supra note 236.
239. See 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51, supra note 237.
240. Council Directive 2001/65, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 28, 29 (EU).
241. Id.
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18, 2003, the European Union adopted another directive requiring
public companies to use International Accounting Standards from
2005 onwards and allowing Member States to extend this requirement
to all companies, including private ones. 24 2
The European Union has also proposed a directive that would
tighten audit rules in Member States.243 Inspired by SOX's
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB),2 44 the proposal calls for public oversight of auditors and
regulatory cooperation among national oversight bodies. 245 The
directive would end European auditors' self-regulation by mandating
that Member States set up regulatory bodies like the PCAOB and the
IAASA. Public companies would be required to establish American-
style independent audit committees responsible for hiring, overseeing,
and firing auditors. 246 Auditors from outside the European Union
would have to register with the Member State's auditor regulator. The
proposal does not call for a complete ban on auditors providing non-
audit services; it instead would ban these services if they would
compromise independence and would ban auditor involvement in
making company management decisions.247
C. U.S. Response
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 2002, the
oversight and responsibilities of numerous corporate actors greatly
increased. Prior to SOX, auditors self-regulated 24 8 but that practice
changed with the establishment of the PCAOB. 249 The PCAOB sets
242. Council Directive 2003/51, 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16, 16-17 (EU).
243. See Commission Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts,
COM (2004) 177 final (Mar. 16, 2004).
244. See id. at 2. The proposal is careful, however, not to seem like an
impulsive response to corporate misconduct. It states "[t]his proposal is not a knee-
jerk reaction to recent corporate scandals. It is the logical consequence of a
reorientation of the EU policy on statutory audit started back in 1996." Id.
245. Id. at 26.
246. Id. at 16.
247. Id. at 22.
248. See Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the Ramifications of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 501, 506 (2004).
249. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
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audit standards, investigates violations of Securities and Exchange
Commission rules and regulations, and can punish violators with
censures, removal from auditing projects, limitations on activities,
suspension, and fines of up to $15 million.250 Its activities are funded
by mandatory fees assessed on the auditing companies that it
regulates. 251 Audit firms must register with the PCAOB before issuing
audit reports to the public, and are required to maintain work papers
for seven years252 or longer if the PCAOB deems it necessary. 253
Large audit firms (those that audit at least 100 clients) can expect an
annual PCAOB inspection, and smaller firms can expect one at least
every three years.254 Audit firms must rotate the partner in charge of a
certain client file every five years.255 SOX applies with equal force to
foreign audit firms as it does to firms headquartered in the United
States.256
Perhaps the biggest change to the auditing profession is that
auditing firms may no longer provide non-audit services to their
public company clients, including "financial information system
design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services, internal
auditing services, investment banking services, legal and expert
services unrelated to the audit, brokerage services, and actuarial
"251services.
Board structure is now the subject of congressional mandate as
SOX requires that public companies have an audit committee that is
solely responsible for choosing, paying, and receiving the work of
external auditors.258 Congress also mandates that directors who sit on
the audit committee have no consulting, advisory, or compensatory
connection to the company or its subsidiaries. 259 The audit committee
must establish procedures to receive complaints about accounting
250. Id. § 105.
251. Id. § 109.
252. Id. §§ 102, 103(a)(2)(A)(i).
253. Id. § 104(e).
254. Id. § 104(b).
255. Id. § 203.
256. Id. § 106(a)(1).
257. Romano, supra note 84, at 1533; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(a).
258. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301.
259. Id.
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matters and must receive confidential, anonymous submissions by
employees concerned about accounting practices. 260 An auditor's
client is now the audit committee instead of the corporation's senior
management.261
A company's CEO and CFO must sign financial statements to
certify that the statements do not contain material misrepresentations
or omissions and that the financial statements "fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of
the [company] ... 262 The signing officers must certify, under threat
of criminal penalty, 263 that they are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls. 264  Implicit in the certification
requirement is that executives implement internal controls and that
they monitor these controls; 265 SOX goes further and makes that
requirement explicit by requiring corporations to file reports assessing
the internal controls. 266 If executive misconduct causes a corporation
to restate its financial reports, the malfeasant executives may have to
forfeit bonuses, incentive-based compensation, and any profit from the
sale of stock or options made during the previous year.267 Prior to
SOX, executives at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, and
Adelphia Communications were given hundreds of millions of dollars
in low- or no-interest loans from their companies' coffers.268
Consequently, SOX now prevents corporations from making loans to
executives or directors.269
Like auditors, attorneys were primarily self-regulated prior to the
enactment of SOX. By passing the corporate governance legislation,
Congress created a "report up, report out" system where lawyers who
find evidence of financial misconduct must report their findings to the
260. Id.
261. Lucci, supra note 84, at 225.
262. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302.
263. Id. § 906(a).
264. Id. § 302(a)(4).
265. Romano, supra note 84, at 1540.
266. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
267. Id. § 304.
268. Romano, supra note 84, at 1538.
269. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a). Sarbanes-Oxley exempts loans made in the
"ordinary course of the consumer credit business" or loans which are "generally
made available. . . to the public." Id.
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corporation's CEO or chief in-house counsel.27° If the executive does
not remedy the situation, the attorney must report his findings to the
audit committee or the board of directors.271 If the situation is still not
remedied, the attorney should make a "noisy withdrawal" where he
publicly quits his engagement with the company.272 In addition, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to create
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before it,
273
encroaching on the disciplinary area once wholly reserved for state
bars.
V. ANALYSIS: CONVERGENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY
Two points for comparison arise when discussing international
corporate scandals and legislative responses: whether the responses
are proportionate to the problem and whether countries are coming up
with similar solutions to similar problems. To assist the analysis of
convergence, Table 1 provides a comparison of numerous new
provisions in both the United States and Ireland. It also lays the
groundwork for a discussion of proportionality, because the side-by-
side comparison illustrates to what extent a particular requirement was
put into legal effect.
270. Id. § 307.
271. Id.
272. Lucci, supra note 84, at 222.
273. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307.
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TABLE 1
A. Convergence
A flowchart mapping the development of corporate governance
might show that new ideas come from the United States, are distilled
by the European Union, and applied by Member States as they see fit.
Ireland saw fit to copy the audit regulator, the audit committee, and
the requirement that directors must personally sign off on financial
statements.274 European countries do not wholly plagiarize U.S.
legislation, however; the Irish statutes borrow provisions relating to
audit regulators, audit committees, and sign-off rules but require
274. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
New Requirement U.S. Specifics Irish Specifics
Members must have no Members must not have
Audit Committee current connection to worked for company in last
company three years; minimum of
two members
Financial Statement Executives must certify Directors, companies, and
Certification auditors must certify
PCAOB-regulators IASSA-regulators from the
Regulatory Bodies independent of the audit audit firms they regulate
firms they regulate DCE
Client Malfeasance Attorneys must report up, Auditors must report to
Reporting may report out DCE
Auditors barred from Auditors may provide non-
providing non-audit audit services
Auditor Regulation services; head audit
partner rotated every 5
years; auditors answer to
audit committee
Attorneys must report up, None
may report out; SEC may
create professional
conduct standards
Executives barred from None
taking non-ordinary loans
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different behavior from each.275 Nonetheless, corporate governance
rules are converging and Irish laws show this movement.
The governments of Ireland, the European Union, and the United
States all require foreign auditors to register with a regulatory body,
and all three have tightened rules about how auditors may provide
non-audit work. The IAASA followed the PCAOB in taking away
auditor self-regulation. If the European Union had its way, auditors'
self-regulation would end completely because every Member State
would set up an auditor regulator of its own.2 7 6 The PCAOB and
IAASA surely have their differences: the members of the PCAOB are
all independent regulators, whereas accounting bodies comprise
IAASA membership.2 7 7 But auditors on both sides of the Atlantic are
now governed by and paying fees to a regulator that did not exist prior
to the corporate scandals.
Convergence in board structure has brought the audit committee
to Ireland, and it has been described as "a new concept in Irish
company law." 278 Where previously optional, audit committees are
now required in the United States and Ireland, and the European
Union wants all Member State companies to have them. All three
governments insist that the committees be comprised of independent
directors even though they define independence differently.279 Here,
there are issues of efficacy:
275. See discussion supra Part IV.
276. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, at
16, COM (2004) 177 final (Mar. 16, 2004).
277. Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act, 2003 (Act No. 44/2003) (Ir.)
§ 6. The following bodies are statutory members of the Authority: the Irish Business
and Employees Confederation, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Irish
Association of Investment Managers, the Irish Stock Exchange, the Pensions Board,
the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority, the Revenue Commissioners, the
Director of Corporate Enforcement, and the Law Society of Ireland. Id.
278. Brian Hutchinson, The Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003-
An Overview, 11 COMM. L. PRAC. 141, 143 (2004).
279. The European Union would have the committee "consist only of board
members who do not participate in the day-to-day management, i.e., by board
members who are not also managers." ERIK WERLAUFF, EU-COMPANY LAW:
COMMON BUSINESS LAW OF 28 STATES 559 (Hanne Gron trans., 2d ed. 2003). In
Ireland, the CAAA bars those who have been employees of the company within the
last three years from serving on the audit committee. Companies (Auditing &
Accounting) Act, 2003 (Act No. 44/2003) (Ir.) § 42. SOX mandates that directors
35
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[t]he parallels with America's corporate scandals do not end with
the fallibility of auditors. The lack of independence of non-
executive directors on the board is another issue in common.
Parmalat's was stuffed with family members and local cronies.
Despite a 1999 reform that imposed independent directors on listed
Italian companies, big ones such as Parmalat were allowed to opt
out.
280
Both SOX and the CAAA make directors personally liable for
their company's financial statements by requiring that they sign the
statements to attest to their accuracy.281 There are differences between
the laws as well: Ireland requires directors, companies, and auditors to
sign off on the accuracy of financial statements,282 whereas the United
States only requires executives to sign compliance statements.283
Some have questioned whether this will hurt Ireland's position as an
attractive location for foreign investment. 284
Enron was the catalyst for change in Europe as well as in the
United States. The EU Action Plan stated that its goal was to "review
further corporate governance and auditing issues in the light of the
Enron case.",285 Similarly, commentators have noted "Europeans
should stop smugly believing that corporate malfeasance is an
who sit on the audit committee have no consulting, advisory, or compensatory
connection to the company or its subsidiaries. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15
U.S.C. § 7211 (2005).
280. Parma Splat-Europe's Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17,
2004, at 2.
281. Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act § 45; Sarbanes-Oxley Act §
302.
282. Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act § 45.
283. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302.
284. See, e.g., PJ Henehan, Section 45 Will Kill Irish Competitiveness, IRISH
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005 ("In the opinion of a senior executive in an Irish subsidiary of
a large US company that carries on a wide range of sophisticated activities
employing hundreds of people in [Ireland], this section 'at the stroke of a pen makes
Ireland uncompetitive'.... The perception is that things have gone too far in the
US. What is of concern is that the market perceives that Ireland has gone further
than even the US.").
285. See THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT ON A
MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 129 (2002),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/company/docs/modem/report-
en.pdf.
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American vice that cannot occur in the old continent. Instead, they
should fix their corporate-governance and accounting problems with
as much vigour as their American cousins showed after the Enron
wake-up call.",286 Others have commented on the impact of U.S.
legislation in Europe, stating that SOX "seems to have kicked
Europe's protracted process into gear. 'Parmalat was an extra boost,
but the real motor was Sarbanes-Oxley ... Europe had to stand up and
be counted.' ,,2
87
B. Proportionality
Commentators often note how quickly SOX became law: Enron
collapsed on November 9, 2001, and President George W. Bush
signed SOX into law less than nine months later.288 By contrast, the
Irish took more time before passing legislation.289 The reason for this
disparity may be founded on the size of the problem faced in the
respective countries.
The U.S. scandals were much larger than those in Ireland. In the
United States, scandals were measured in billions, while the Irish
scandals were only measured in millions. A U.S. imprimatur touches
every old-world scandal: Elan is headquartered in New York, trades
on the New York Stock Exchange, and conducts its activities mainly
in the United States.290 AIB's troubles came from an American trader
working at a U.S. subsidiary; it was sued by an American investor in
an American court.291 Ahold's problems were the result of
286. Europe's Enron, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003.
287. Auditing Reform: More Rules, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2004 (quoting Neil
Lerner). A more pessimistic view holds that American corporate scandal "provided
an occasion for 'political activism' juicy enough for any well-taught politician and
bureaucrat willing to extract rents." Enriques, supra note 84, at 916.
288. Hamilton, supra note 84, at 6.
289. The Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act was signed into law on
December 23, 2003, twenty-five months after Enron's collapse and months from the
time that Elan's "questionable accounting practices" were first reported. See Elan II,
385 F. Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
290. In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig. (Elan I), No. 02 Civ. 865, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9913, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2004).
291. Tomran, Inc. v. Passano (Tomran 1), 862 A.2d 453, 455 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004).
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malfeasance at USF, an American subsidiary.2 92 Parmalat could not
have hidden so much debt for so long without the complicity of Bank
of America, Grant Thornton, and Deloitte & Touche. Clearly, scandals
in Ireland and Europe are as much American as they are Irish and
European.
When Ireland passed the CAAA, it responded harshly to scandals
small in comparison to those in the United States. The CAAA contains
many provisions similar to SOX: both create auditing regulatory
bodies, address auditors and non-audit work, mandate audit
committees, have "report up, report out" provisions, and require
certification of financial statements.293 However, there are numerous
differences among the similarities: the CAAA has criminal penalties;
Irish auditors are only barred from providing services that lead to
conflicts of interest whereas U.S. auditors may not provide any non-
audit services; Irish directors, even if they are not currently employed
by the company, may not sit on the audit committee if they worked for
the company within the last three years; and Ireland requires directors,
companies, and auditors to certify the accuracy of financial statements
whereas the United States only requires executives to sign compliance
statements. 294 SOX merely allows attorneys to "report up, report out"
whereas the CLEA requires auditors to report company law breaches
to the DCE.295 Furthermore, Irish companies have to deal with the
DCE whose sole job is to enforce the Companies Acts-criminal
provisions and all. When one considers the full extent of the
Companies Acts, 296 the vast power of the DCE, and the fact that
Ireland had less of a corporate crisis to begin with, Irish attempts to
292. But cf Europe's Enron, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003 (The fact that Ahold's
accounting problems occurred primarily at an American subsidiary "has led some
observers to say that this is less a European problem than yet another American
accounting failure. Such an outlandish claim absolves Ahold's bosses of
responsibility for their acquisitions and ignores the persistent, firm-wide tendency to
test the limits of acceptable accounting.").
293. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
294. See, e.g., Henehan, supra note 284 ("While there is a cost of scandal,
there is also a cost of compliance. In this regard, Section 45 goes beyond what is
required of companies in other jurisdictions, particularly the US.").
295. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
296. This includes, for example, Section 150 Orders. See supra text
accompanying note 180.
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prevent future corporate malfeasance are disproportionate to the
problem.
Surely Ireland had corporate problems, but they were compliance
issues, not governance issues. Ireland's compliance problems received
their due response: a watchdog in the DCE. The CLEA deals more
with compliance than governance-it was passed in early 2001, before
Enron and the other corporate scandals came to light, and it forced
companies to answer to the government rather than to various
stakeholders. Even so, the CLEA is harsh; the DCE has incredible
power-police power, prosecutorial power, regulatory power, even
banishment power.2 97 The Director himself can make a company's life
very hard; there is not any one U.S. regulator with that much
influence.
With regard to the EU's role in its Member States' affairs, the
British newspaper The Economist concisely explained the need for EU
corporate regulation:
Italy has a reputation for poor corporate governance combined with
the shameless exploitation of minority shareholders. But much the
same can be said of other European countries, including France, the
Netherlands and Switzerland, where this week Adecco, the world's
largest temporary-employment agency, said it expects to delay the
announcement of its 2003 results because of "possible accounting,
control and compliance issues ... in certain countries." Most
European countries have mere codes of practice for corporate
297.
"Tybalt is dead, and Romeo--banished;"
That "banished," that one word "banished,"
Hath slain ten thousand Tybalts. Tybalt's death
Was woe enough, if it had ended there:
Or, if sour woe delights in fellowship
And needly will be rank'd with other griefs,
Why follow'd not, when she said "Tybalt's dead,"
Thy father, or thy mother, nay, or both,
Which modem lamentations might have moved?
But with a rear-ward following Tybalt's death,
"Romeo is banished," to speak that word,
Is father, mother, Tybalt, Romeo, Juliet,
All slain, all dead. "Romeo is banished!"
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 3, sc. 2.
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governance, rather than legal statutes, and progress towards
meeting the standards of the codes has been patchy at best.
298
Yet instead of mandating those statutes, the EU's response seems
more academic than binding. The main conclusion of the Action Plan
was that the European Union did not need a Europe-wide corporate
governance code. 299 The European Union sees its role as a body that
facilitates the exchange of best practices rather than as a creator or
300 scenforcer of such practices. In such a role, the European Union
should study the effects of SOX, the CLEA, and the CAAA and
propose their pearls to other European countries. The European Union
created the European Corporate Governance Forum to do just that,
notwithstanding the fact that the Forum has had the predictable result
of much talk and only one substantive recommendation. 30'
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Convergence is necessary because Parmalat was not just an Italian
problem, AIB was not just an Irish concern, and Enron was not just an
American crisis. "The question is whether Europe's principles-based
approach can endure., 30 2 The answer seems to be no: with Ireland as
an indication, Europe is moving to a rules-based approach where
government mandates accounting standards and nearly every aspect of
the company is regulated.
Convergence, however, is not without its critics. As reported in
The Economist:
America's rules are much more prescriptive and numerous. For
example, the American ban on accounting firms providing some
(but not all) non-audit work to audit clients, the certification of
company accounts by company bosses and the requirement that a
298. Parma Splat-Europe's Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17,
2004. Note that Switzerland is not a member of the European Union.
299. Action Plan, supra note 224, at 11.
300. Id. at 11-12.
301. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
302. Auditing Reform: More Rules, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2004.
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"financial expert" (painstakingly defined by the SEC) be on each
audit committee do not feature in the ... (EU] proposals. 30 3
Europeans have questioned the efficacy of some American ideas:
"[r]otation of auditors-one of the more controversial measures
introduced in July 2002 by the Sarbanes-Oxley act [sic] . . . seems to
have been of little use [in the Parmalat scandal]. 30 4 Even if the
rotation of auditors was of little use in Parmalat, we simply cannot
know how many time bombs such an auditor rotation may have
diffused.
On balance, the United States has the soft power to influence
worldwide corporate governance and the European Union has the hard
power to converge its Members' laws. Through its legislative power
to direct Member State law, the European Union can streamline
European corporate law and governance. If proposals and action plans
are any indication, the European Union plans to do more. Ireland is a
prime example of the European move towards American-style, rule-
based governance.
303. Id.
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